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RECENT CASES
Administrative Law-Judicial Impartiality Required of Personnel of State lMilk Marketing Board-The Michigan Milk Marketing Act 2 created a board to consist of "The Commissioner of Agriculture
2

. .

. milk producers . . . i . . . distributor, and I . . .

consumer . . ."2 with power to regulate the industry.3 Plaintiff distributor, whose methods differed from those of orthodox distributors,"
attacked the constitutionality of this provision, in challenging orders of the
board fixing minimum prices." Held (two judges dissenting), the provision violates the due process clause of the state constitution, since an impartial hearing which satisfies the requirements of due process could not have
been given by the board because of personal interest. Johnson v. Michigan
Milk Marketing Board, 295 N. W. 346 (Mich. 194o).
A judge in a truly judicial proceeding apparently must have no direct
pecuniary interest in its determination.6 Nor may power be constitutionally delegated to private individuals to regulate the business practices of
their competitors. 7 The instant case is apparently the first to require disinterestedness in a state administrative board regulating a competitive industry.' The court's temerity in requiring strict judicial standards of an
administrative body is perhaps remarkable today.9 However, the danger
z.5 Micx. Comp. LAWS (Mason, Cure. Supp. 1940) § 5394-41 et seq.
s1ficis. ComP. LAWS (Mason, Cum. Supp. I94O) § 5394-45. -

2.

3. The Act is in most other material respects substantially similar to legislation
now existing in seventeen other states. It provides for fixing of maximum and minimum prices for wholesaling and retailing of milk, a hearing of interested parties before
the board before issuance of orders, and judicial review limited to the Supreme Court

of Michigan.

4. By selling from central stores rather than delivering, and by ignoring the classified price system in purchasing from producers, Johnson had been able profitably to

sell fluid milk at from two to four cents below the going price, while paying the producer a price no less than the average paid by orthodox distributors. However, these
bitterly opposed his inroads on the delivery system of milk retailing. The farmers also

preferred the classified price system of selling to distributors. Let 'Em Drink Grade A
(Nov. 1939) FORTUNE 83, 134 et seq. The producer member at least would have an
active personal interest in destroying Johnson's system.
5. Prices to be paid to the producer on the basis of the base-surplus method, and
minimum prices to be charged consumers based on the preservation of the delivery system would be necessarily ruinous to Johnson's method of business.
6. Trial before a disqualified judge is denial of due process. See Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U. S. 510, 522 (1927) (criminal case) ; 2 C O.EY, CONSTITUTIONAL LimITATION
(Sth ed. 1927) 870 et seq., unless no other court is available, as in a final appeal to a
court of last resort, Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S. 245 (920).
A remote or trifling interest
does not disqualify, 2 COOLEY, op. cit.
supra 872. See, generally, s N. C. L. REV. 357
(x927), and annotation, 5o A. L. R. 1256, which collects the cases.
.7 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 310 (1936).
So likewise a statute giving a municipality power to establish building lines for a district on the tequest of less
than all of the property owners affected has been held unconstitutional. Eubank v.
Richmond, 226 U. S. 137 (1912).
8. In judicial review of the milk control acts of Florida, Georgia, Indiana, and
Virginia, like provisions were not attacked. See notes 14-22" hfra and cases cited in
instant case 349. However, it has hecn determined that presence on a board of assessment of a person whose property is to be affected is violation of due process. Union
Drainage Dist. v. Smith, 233 Ill.
417, 84 N. E. 376 (I9o8). Contra: Hibben v. Smith,
191 U. S. 31o (:o3) ; and see Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316, 333 (I89t). A close fact
situation was considered in dictum in Andrew Lanneta Funesal Home v. State Board
of Undertakers, 27 F. Supp. 518 (F. D. Pa. 1939), where it was held that the fact that
one of the members of under taker licensing board was a member of the prosecuting
undertakers' association was not evidence that he had "any such direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in the case as would amount to a disqualification, which in
itself vould constitute on infringenicet of due process." (italics supplied.)
9. See 'Morgan v. U. S., 32 F. Supp. 546. 56r, 562 (W. D. fo. 1940) (dissenting
opinion). "Rate making" hearings of administrative agencies have been held to require
(977)
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of discriminatory rulings against an unrepresented faction by a board composed of actively competing members of adversely interested groups is recognizable, 10 particularly in the milk marketing industry where divergence
of group interests is sharp."' But the danger lies not in the fact that the
board is composed of interested groups, but in that all groups are not represented. Convenience calls for retention of the system here invalidated.
Familiarity of members with current problems, wholehearted representation of the interests of the producer, who is impotent to mend his position
other than through state action, 12 as well as a saving in salaries from the
part-time character of its membership are among its advantages. Of
twenty existing milk control statutes, 13 eight contain provisions similar to
the Michigan statute and would be invalidated by adoption of the rule of
this case.'4 The remaining statutes probably avoid the risk by naming a
regular state officer, 15 or a whole department,"8 by employing a full time
board,17 or by providing for a board "representative" of the interested
groups."8 They obtain experience and true representation of the projudicial safeguards at least as to notice and right to present evidence. See discussion

in Note (19 9) 27 GEo. L. J. 486. But the instant case has been criticized as logically
inconsistent in holding the administrative process in question to be "legislative" in nature
while requiring judicial safeguards. (194I) 54 HAV. L. REV. 872.
In state boards for regulation of the professions, where a degree of pecuniary interest is necessary in securing persons qualified by experience and knowledge for memship, disinterestedness has not been demanded. See Brinkley v. Hassig, 83 F. (2d) 351,
353 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936), where actual prejudice in a member of the board was held
not to invalidate its rulings. The rulings of such boards have been held to be judicial
in their nature. Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505 (1902).
io. The point made by the dissenting judges, that hoard members are state officers
presumptively disinterested, hardly appears weighty. Note the language of the court
in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 311, "for it is not ev, delegation to an
official or official body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same business." The
problem lies in the fact that under the type of statute in question here the commissioners are both officials presumptively disinterested and private persons with interests adverse to those of others in the same business.
That appellate review is allowed has been held to justify relaxation of standards of
conduct of price fixing hearings, State Board of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co., 1i8
N. J. Eq. 504, 179 AtI. i6 (1936). But such review, going only to proof of actual
prejudice or partiality, or of complete inadequacy of evidence pointing toward the result
reached is hardly satisfying, and perhaps should not be a determining factor.
ii.For general discussion of the marketing conflicts between different types of
distributor, see Lct 'Ent D,'ink Grade A (Nov. 1939) FoaruXR 83, Mlilk h; Chicago
(Nov. 1o39) FORTUNE 80.
12. For the particular problems calling forth the w.ve of state regulatcry acts concerning the milk marketing industry, and the workl.tig of the acts in relieving the economic bondage of the producer, see Note (1935) 3 GFo. WASH. L. REv. 494: Carey,
PracticalApplication of M!ilk Regulation Through Administrative Age:cies (1939) 14
CALIF. STATE BAR.

J. 262.

i3.See footnotes 14-20 htfra.
14. Ala. Gen. Acts r939 No. 164, p. 267, § 3; Fla. Gen. Laws 1939, c. 19231, § 3;
Ga. Laws 1037 No. 374, P.247, § 3; IND. STAT. AN-N. (Caldwin, Supp. 1935) § 3647-6
(partly representative) ; fe. Laws 1935, c. 13, § 2; Mont. Laws 1939, c. 2-04, § 4, P. 512;
R. I. GF.N. LAwS A.N.N. (1938) C. 215, § 1, P. 458; VA. CODE A N.N. (.Michie, 1936)
§ I211x.

15. Vt. Gen. Laws 1933 No. 8, p. 387; CoNN. GEN. SAT. (Supp. 1935) c. 1oa,
797c76. Wis. Laws !933, c. 64, p. 235 (Department of Agriculture
and Markets).
(Purdon, Supp. 1940) tit. 31, §7ooj-2o2; Mass. Acts 1934,
17. PA. STAT. AN-.
C.376, p. 538; N. H. Laws 1937, c. 107, p. 139. Full-time officers, however, are a luxury
in states where the commission is supported directly by the industry, since it need meet
only occasionally.
i8. N. J. Laws 1939, C.82. p. 136: see IxD. STAT. AxN. (Baldwin, Supp. 1935)
§ 3647-6; N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, Supp. 1931-1935) c. 1, § 258-1 (advisory). But
there might be some question whether an a'-t patterned on that of New Jersey would
be satisfactory in Michigan. The court in the instant case has been justifiably criticized
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ducer's interest by providing for advisory boards of persons actively engaged in the industry,19 or that the commissioner have previously been a
producer.20 Possibility of satisfactory legislative adoption of some such
substitute for the21 rejected provision softens the impact of the decision in
the instant case.
Bankruptcy-Purchase on Credit Without Present Intent to. Pay
as False Repiesentation Under § 17a (2) of the Bankruptcy ActSeller recovered damages of buyer in the state court on an allegation of
intentional non-disclosure of a present intent not to pay at the time of purchase. Buyer, after a general discharge in bankruptcy, brought this action
to enjoin garnishment proceedings by seller on the judgment debt. Held,
iijunction granted; the judgment debt was not based on "false pretenses"
or "false representations" so as to avoid the operation of the general discharge under § i7a (2) of the Bankruptcy Act.' Davison-Paxon Co. v.
CaIdwell, ii5.F. (2d) 189 (C. C. A. 5th, I94O).
Under § I7a (2) provable debts "such as are a liability for obtaining
money or property by false pretenses or failse representations" survive a:
general discharge. 2 A purchase of goods with intent not to pay for them
is generally subject to rescission for fraud, 3 but the few cases which raise
the question whether such facts will support a tort action for damages'
are divided. It has been held that the purchase alone is not sufficient representation, and that some overt statement or further act tending to deceive
is necessary. In Georgia, however, recovery is alldwed,6 though not merely
for failing "to set standards of disinterestedness to guide the legislature. . . ." (x941)
54 HARv. L. R-v. 872. Only Oregon flatly stipulates that the Board must contain no
interested member, 5 OaRE. CoDE AN. (1935) § 41-20O2.
19. CAL. CODE AGRIC. (Deering, Supp. 1937) § 736.13; N. Y. Coxs. LAWS (Cahill,
Supp. 1931-1935) C.1. § 258-I (advisory board partly representative).
20. Co-Nx. GEN. STAT. (Supp.. 1935) c. io~a, § 797c.
21. The immediate effect of the vacating of all orders of the board, however, may
be temporarily disastrous to the producer as well as the complainant. See (194o) 89
U. OF PA. L. REV. 403, 405.

(1938), I U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1940) §35a (2).
provision of the Act of 189, which broadly removed "Judgments in
actions for frauds", 30 STAT. 554 (1898), v;as amended in 19o3 to substantially the form
of the present provision, 30 STAT. 550 (i903), II U. S. C. A. § 35 (2). There would
1. 52 STAT. 851
2. The parallel

of course have been no question as to the present type of case under the Act of i89&
3. RESTATE.MENT, "CoNTrLCTS (1932) §§ 473, 476. California Conserving Co. v.

DAvanzo, 62 F. (2d) 528 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933). Not so in Pennsylvania, Smith v.
Smith Murphy Co., 21 Pa. 367 (1853), criticized and limited in Allen v. Sarsehick, 299
Pa. 257. 148 At. 25 (1930).

4. Paucity of case law on this exact point may be attributed to obvbour practical
advantages of the alternate actions for breach of contract or rescission, save in particular circumstances
where the statute of frauds, or a discharge in bankruptcy would
•otherwise
bar tle debt.
5.i re Nuttal. 201 Fed. 557, 562 (S.D. N. Y. 1912); Donovan v. Clifford, 225
Mass. 435, 114 N. E. 60, (917); s e Dawe v. Morris, 149 fass. i83, 192,2t N. E. 313,
314 (i K9). Apparently the reason is fear of fabrication of tort actions to avoid statutory bars to the coiltract action.
Those states which yet refuse to recognize miqreprescntttion of a state of mind as

actionable, Woods v. Scott, 178 At. _86 (Vt. 1935), would of course allow no tort recovery on that ground, an entirely different point. But misrepresentation of intent is
now usually held suflcient to support a cause of action for deceit. Feldman v. Witmark, 2-4 Mas. 4"80,
I-o N. E. 329 (1926); Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v.
Kellcy-Iow-Thomson Co., 64 F. (2d) 834 (C. C. A. 8th. 1933), cert. denicd, 290 U. S.
651 (033). The editor in (i941) 54 HARv. L. R-v.S73, appears to have assumed that
the instant ca.,e
turns on this point.
6. Crawford v. Davison-Paxon Co., 46 Ga. App. 16t, 166 S. E. 872 (1932); Atlanta Skirt .Mfg. Co. v. Jacobs, 8 Ga. App. -9, 67 S. E. 1o77, 1o78 (T910). The lead-
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insolvency at the time of the purchase is required, but a showing by statements to third persons, or by proof of contemplated bankruptcy or that the
purchases were extravagant or unusual, of actual intent to deceive.,

The

question whether Congress intended to include such conduct by the words
"false representations or false pretences" in § I7a (2) is concluded by

8
neither view, although it necessarily arises only in jurisdictions following
the Georgia rule. Georgia's courts have consistently maintained the affirma0
9
The apparent purpose
tive, despite strong federal dicta to the contrary."
1
is
of the provision, to prevent the statute from benefiting a wrongdoer,
in
questionable
case
is
best subserved by the Georgia view. The instant
so far as based on limiting the meaning of the words of the statute to verbal
2
A consideration perhaps more
misrepresentation or active concealment.1
fundamental in inducing the present result was fear of fabrication of claims
of deceit where contract debts based on purchases by the insolvent would
8
Such considerations -should not lead to an engraftment on
be barred.'

ing case on the point is Swift v. Rounds, i9 R. I. 527, 35 At. 45 (1896). If the view
be accepted that a misrepresentation of a present intent may be actionable, and further
that a misrepresentation may be made by acts as well as -by words, it is perfectly sound
to allow recovery in tort for false pretences for the conduct in question, see Commonwealth v. Morrison, 252 Mass. i16, 122, 147 N. E. 588, 59o (1925) ; WILLIS'rO. SALES
(2d ed. 1924) a6o6. See also Boerner v. Cicero Smith Lumber Co., 293 S. W. 632
(Tex. Civ. App. 1927), and Graham Nat. Bank v. Princeton State Bank, 128 Wis. 6o,
107 N. W. 452 (tort liability allowed without much consideration of the problems involved).
7. Brooks v. Pitts, 24 Ga. App. 386, 100 S. E. 776 (1919) ; Atlanta Skirt Mfg. Co.
v. Jacobs. But the rule requiring stringent proof seems to have been somewhat relaxed. Crawford v. Davison-Paxon Co., 46 Ga. App. 161, 166 S. E. 872 (1932), (1933)
17 MINN. L. REv. 658; Donnelly Co. v. Milligan, 37 Ga. App. 530, 240 S. E. g18
(927), and REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY (5th ed. 1939) 797 (criticizing the Craurord

case).

8&Although such conduct undoubtedly constitutes "false pretences or false representations" in Georgia, see cases cited note 6 supra, the same words as used in the
bankruptcy statute might perfectly logically mean something different. Further, the
federal courts have a discretionary jurisdiction in interpreting the act and are not bound
by Erie R. R. v. Thompkins. See Note (1934) 21 VA. L. REV. 220.
9. Atlanta Skirt Mfg. Co. v. Jacobs, 8 Ga. App. 299, 67 S. E. 1077, 1078 (191o),
and other Georgia cases cited in notes 6 and 7 supra. The Texas rule is the same,
Boerner v. Cicero Smith Lumber Co., 293 S. W. 632 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); ef.
Louisville Dry Goods. Co. v. Lannian, 135 Ky. 163, 12 S. W. io42 (1909) (where the
court evidently did not have the amendment of 19o3, note 2 supra, before it). And cf.
also Stewart v. Emerson, 52 N. H. 301, 322 (1872) (under bankruptcy act of 1867).
io.Zimmern v. Blount, 238 Fed. 740, 744 (C. C. A. 5th, 1917) ; fit rc Nuttal, 2ox

Fed. 557 (S. D. N. Y.

2912).

ii.Stewart v. Emerson, 52 N. H. 301, 322 (1872). The purpose of the act prior
to the 29o3 amendment was generally held to be to relieve "the honest citizen . . .
from the burden of hopeless insolvency." Forsyth v. Vehmeyer, 177 U. S. 277, 18i
(19o)
(italics supplied). Accordirigly sharp distinction was made between "implied
fraud, or fraud in law which may exist %;ithoutimputation of bad faith or immorality."
Ames v. Moir, 138 U. S. 306, 311 (I89i), and actual deceitful conduct. Query whether
the amendment of 19o3 should be held to have embodied a change in purpose of this
provision. "Congress intended . . . to prevent the bankrupt from retaining the benefits of property acquired by fraudulent means." Rudstromn v. Sheridan, 122 Minn. 262,
265, i42 N. E. 313 (1913), see Hiscy v. Lewis Gale Hospital, 27 F. Supp,. 20, 23 (939).
The committee report on the amendment gives no evidence of such design. H. R. REP.
No. 1698, 57th Cong., Ist Sess. (1902) 3, 6.
12. Denial of discharges is strictly construed. Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U. S. 558
(1915), "in view of the well-known purposes of the Bankrupt Law." But is the court
strictly construing the language of the statute, or enlarging it by implying the word
"verbal" before "representations"? And is this limitation "in view of the purposes of
the Act"?
13. See In re Caldwell, 33 F. Supp. 631 (N. D. Ga. 1940) (Instant case in lower
federal court) to the effect that this fear is not wifommided, particularly in view of the
relaxation in recent cases of the stiu!,1nt Georgia rule requiritig strict evidence of
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§ 17 of a technical distinction whereby the intentional wrongdoer is granted
the buckler of the statute to protect the fruits of his wrongdoing."'
Evidence-Physician-Patient Privilege Extended to Proceedings before Legislative Investigating Committee-A legislative committee, appointed to investigate charges of maladministration of a city
hospital, had the Commissioner of Hospitals subpoenaed, demanding the
production of hospital records of certain patients. The Commissioner
refused, relying on § 352 of the New York Civil Practice Act, which
states: "A person duly authorized to practice physic or surgery . . .
shall not be allowed to disclose any information which he acquired in
attending a patient in a profersional capacity." ' By § 354 this privilege
is applicable "to any examination of a person-as a witness unless the provisions thereof are expressly waived . . . in open court. ....

"

The

conmittee contended that the legislature by stating that the privilege might
be waived "in open court" intended that the privilege should apply only
to "judicial proceedings". Held, the statute prohibtis the production of
the records. Matter of City Council of Necw York v. Goldwater, 31 N. E.
(2d) 31 (N. Y. i94o).
A creature of statute and unknown at common law, the physicianpatient privilege has in recent years been limited by .the legislatures and
courts' and criticized by the writers. The policy behind the statute as
stated by those who promulgated it 8 was the protection of the patient by
allowing him to make a full disclosure of his condition to his physician
without fear of having the information used against him at a later date.
The instant case appears to be the first in which a physician had claimed
this privilege in other than a court trial.? On the basis of an early dictum
to the effect that the statute should be given a "broad and liberal construction to carry out its policy" 8 the instant decision extends the privilege to
legislative investigation' in the face of the strongest tendency in other jurisdictions to limit the doctrine.' 0 It may be argued that the disclosure of
present intent tiot to pay. See note 7 supro. So in the instant case the tort claim was
brought on an1 open account which had been running three years.

In England under the Act of

1914,

the court has discretion to refuse or suspend the

entire discharge where it appears that "the bankrupt has continued to trade after knowing himself insolvent," BALDvI.,
B.ANKRUIPTCY (iIth ed. 1915) 728, 736. This is not
the American rule. The essentials of a misrepresentation of financial solvency could
be eaqily dicovered in a purchase by an insolvent, see note 6 supra, but the element of
bad faith or intent to deceive would be lacking.
There is a further disinclination to reward negligent business practices such as advancing credit to an insolvent, In re C7ahlwell, 33 F. Supp. 631, 635, even %%llerethe
claim is not fabricated.
14. Since Georgia strictly requires "intention not to pay" it is difficult to see how
the fear of the Federal court can be articulated without inipliedly denying the capacity
of Georgia courts to enforce their own law.
1.
2.
3.
4.

N. Y. CIv. PRAc. AcT. (Cahill, 1931) §352.
N. Y. CIV. PRaC Actr (Cahill, 1931) §354.
8 NVIGMoRr, Evr'mFxcF (3d ed. i94o) § 23,0.
For numerous exanples of such limitations, see Callahan and Ferguson, Ez'id,nce and the New Fedcral Rides of Ch-il Proced.re: 2 (1937) 47 YA.E L. J. 194, 208.
r. 8 \V1,.Moic , op. cit. supra rote 3, at § 238oa; see also note 4 supra.
6. See Report of Coininissioners on Revision of the Statutes of New York III, 737

(1836).

7. (194)
54 MARV. L. REa. 705.
8. Bufialo Loan, Trust and Safe Deposit Co. v. The Knights Tenplar and Masonic
Mutual Ai'l Association, 126 N. Y. 450, 455, 27 N. E. 942, 943 (1891).
9- S.'e ;nstant cae at 33 (dissenting opinion).
T0. See note 4 supra.
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facts before a legislative committee is just as undesirable from the patient's
point of view as a disclosure before a judicial tribunal. This argument
ignores, however, the presence of the policy in favor of the disclosire to
the legislative bodies of all facts necessary for their guidance in forming
rules for the benefit of the whole community. It is not reasonable that
in passing the statute the legislature intended to deny its agents access to
such information. After quoting the above dictum, the court went on to
lay down a ruling which protects the physician and a small group of
patients in a situation where the physician is being investigated for the
protection of all patients as a class. It -is submitted that before extending
a much criticized rule, the court should have weighed the public interest
in the disclosure of the information as against the patient's interest in its
concealment, especially since it is evident that the privilege is being claimed,
not for the patient's benefit, but for the physician. However, as the law
now stands, the information may be obtained only by securing a waiver of
the privilege by each of the individual patients involved."
Fair Labor Standards Act-Computation of Overtime-Employee's wages by contract were higher than the minimum wage required
by statute,1 which also provided that compensation for overtime should be
computed "at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate
at which he is employed." 2 The employee claimed overtime based on the
rate he was in fact earning. Held, that the overtime should be computed
on the basis of the minimum wage. Belo Corp. v. Sreet, 9 U. S. L. WEEK
2468 (N. D. Texas 1941). Contra: Floyd v. DuBois Soap Co., 9 U. S. L
WEEK 2481 (Ohio C. P. i94i).
These conflicting decisions resulted from the lack of an administrative
rule-making power, one of the outstanding difficulties I in the Act from the
point of view of uniform results. Hence it falls to the courts to define the
language of the Act as applied to specific cases. The result of the Belo case
seems unreasonably harsh. It is difficult to understand how "regular rate"
can be construed 5 to mean "minimum rate", since one of the aims of the
it.See note 2 supra.
1. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr OF 1938, 52 STAT. o6o, § 6, 29 U. S. C. A. (Cum.
Supp. i940) § 2o6.
2. FAIR LABOR STAND.ARDS Acr OF 1938, 52 STAT. o6o, § 7 (a) (3), 29 U. S. C. A.
(Cure. Supp. 194o) § 207 (a) (3).
3. Contra: Emerson v. Mary Lincoln Candies, Inc., 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 570 (Sup.
Ct. 194o); cf. Gurtov v. Volk, 70 Misc. 322, it N. Y. S. (2d) 6o4 (N. Y. City Ct.

'939).

4. The issuance of "interpretative bulletins" by the Wage and Hour Division was
the result of Congress' failure to include a rule-making provision therein. See Herman,
T7w Administration and Enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 368 (1939). In the face of this handicap, it seems that the courts
should, by judicial decision, aid the enforcement of the Act whenever its terms, as in
the instant case, are not clearly ambiguous. And see Andrews, .1faking the 17age-Hour
Law Work, 29 Am. LABOR Lmx. REv. 53 (1939), where the Administrator says, "The
necessity for a well-prepared enforcement activity during the initial period of co-operation is not so much emotional as economic, and it is probable that the majority of employers who do comply are watching with interests the fatc of those who attempt
evasion."
S. Regular rate may mean (t) the hourly rate which the employee actually earns
during normal hours, (2) the rate which is usual for similar employees throughout the
business, and (3) the rate prescribed by rules. The second alternative will usually be
similar to the first, because of unionization; besides, where there is a collective bargaining agreement, the wage scale of the Act does not apply, because of section 7 (b).
The third filternative is inapplicable here because of the word "regular" in the rule

itself.
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Act is to prevent lowering of existing hourly rates where they exceed the
minimum set by the Act. This in itself is some indication that Congress
would have said "minimum rate" in this section had it so intended. Furthermore, the purpose of the overtime provision was apparently to expand
employment by making overtime prohibitively expensive. 6 Section 18 of
the Act provides that "No provision of this Act shall justify any employer
in reducing a wage paid by him which is in excess of the applicable minimum wage under this Act 7 . . .", and if overtime be computed at the
minimuni
rate instead of the "wage paid by him", there may be an illegal
reduction %vithinthe meaning of this section. Both interpretative bulletins '
and regulations 1 have construed "regular rate" to mean the present hourly
rate of the employee; however, these pronouncements have merely persuasive influence 10 on the courts. The court in the Belo case states that the
Act did not "strike down the right of the employee and employer to contract with reference to the wages which are in excess of minimum wages,
and that is the way these employees have done"." If this statement assumes a situation where the employer is paying a wage in excess of the
minimum for normal hours and has expressly contracted with these employees that overtime should be based on the minimum, then it is arguable
that he should not be required to pay overtime at the higher rate when his
whole wage plan would thereby be altered. The Act seems to have made
no provision for such a case,1 2 unless it is contended that .section 18 does
not apply to overtime, and that the employer is still free to contract here
providing the overtime is not based on less than the minimum. But where
the contract is merely to pay more than the mininium wage for normal
hours, it is difficult to justify an implication that overtime should be computed on the basis of the minimum rate.13 The Act itself nowhere estab6. See Cooper, "Extra Time for Overtine" Now Law, 37 MIIc. L. REV. 28, 31
(1938). Apparently this is on the theory that the overtime rate established by the Act

will be expensive enough to compel employment of new help at the minimum rate. Actually it is just as reasonable that employers will use their experienced help for the
overtime work, thus increasing Wages in rush periods.
7. 52 STAT. zo6o, § 1S, 29 U. S. C. A. (Cum. Supp. 1940) § 218. Nor is any employer justified in reducing existing rates by increasing hours of employment maintained by him which are shorter than the maximum hours applicable under this Act.
But apparently any employer may reduce the number of working hours per week if he
does not reduce the hourly wage rate.
8. "The Act is clear that it is the employee's regular rate of pay on which time
and one-half is based and not any minimum wage set in the Act." See Interpretative
Bulletin No. 4. Wage and Hour Division, 2 C. C. H. Labor I.aw Serv. 11"
23040, 23224.
9. U. S. Wage and Hour Reg., § 516.4 (f), 2 C. C. H. Labor Law Serv. 1 31121.04.
The regulation was cited and adhered to in Emerson v. Mary Lincoln Candies, Inc., 2o
N. Y. S. (2d) 57o (Sup. Ct. 1940). In an address by the .former General Counsel of
the Wage and Hour Division, no mention was made of any possible ambiguity in "regular rate". See Magruder, Administrative Proceduresunder the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 25 A. B. A. J. 688 (1939) ; Cf. Cooper, "Extra Time for Overtime" Noto Law, 37
-Miclt. L. REV. 28 (1938).
1O. See Herman, The Adyin istration an, Enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 LAW & CO:T.MP. PRoP. 368 (1939), where the author states that "The
interpretative bulletins are not binding on the intlustry; they are merely legal advice,
stating hypothetical rathr than actual cases." The powers of the Administrator to
igsue binding and authoritative regulations is confined to specific provisions of the Act,

and is of legal neccssity limited in scope. It appears that § 7 is without this confined
orbit. Ibid.
ii. See the Belo case at 2468.
12. By a strict construction of the Act, especially sections 7 (a) (3) and x8, it
would seem that any such contract as to overtime could not be justified. Evidently
then, the employer would also be prevented by section i8 from reducing the rate during
normal hours.
13. "The interpretation urged upon the Wage and Hour Division was that the
overtime provision applied only to employees paid the basic minimum wage rate." See

984

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

lishes

4

or defines "regular rate" of pay, but the purposes of the Act and a
s
reached in
the
Floyd case."
of sections 7 (a) (3) and iS point to the conclusion
comparison
2

Federal Procedure-Jurisdiction of District Court over Counterclaim in Tort against United States-United States sued for damages
suffered by its mail truck in a collision with defendant. Defendant's counterclaim alleged that plaintiff's driver had been negligent. Plaintiff moved
to dismiss the counterclaim on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction
over tort claims against the United States. Held, the United States, having
begun suit, subjected itself to the court's jurisdiction as to counterclaims
arising out of the same transaction. United States v. Dugan Bros., 36 F.
Supp. iO9 (E. D. N. Y. i94o).
At common law the United States was immune from suit,' and statutes
providing for governmental responsibility have expressly excluded liability
in tort. 2 Although the principal case is the first to involve a counterclaim
against the government in common law tort, affirmative judgments have
been obtained against the United States on counterclaims over which the
court would otherwise not have had jurisdiction in a contract case ' and a
libel in maritime tort.4 The theory of these cases is that by instituting suit
the government consents to the adjudication of the whole transaction."
There is considerable language in other cases to the effect that consent to
jurisdiction cannot be implied from the act of a federal officer in bringing
suit,O but this view has been applied almost exclusively to counterclaims
Herman, The Admzistration and Enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6
L.Aw & CONTEMP. PaoB. 368, 369 (1939). That is, employers would not object to pay-

ing

22

hours overtime to a minimum wage-earner, amounting to $5.50; whereas they

balked at paying another worker earning, say, $2.00 per hour, $66 for the 22 hours

overtime.
x4. See note 4 supra. See also Cooper, "Extra Time for Overtime" Now Law, 37
MICH. L. Rav. g8 (1938), where it is observed that the administrative officers are
presented with the determination of many practical problems in the operation of the Act,
including problems of definition which involve the application of the language of the
Act to specific questions.
15. While industry is advised to comply, if in doubt, the employer is not immune
if, in reliance upon an interpretative bulletin, he concludes that the Act is not applicable
to him. See Herman, The Administration and Enforcement of the FairLabor Standards Act, 6 LAw &

CONTE.MP.

PRoI. 368, 379 (I939). Hence a clarification of this

point by the Supreme Court would be timely.

r. Hill v. United States, 9 How. 386 (U. S. i85o); United States v. McLemore,
4 How. 286 (U. S.1846).

2. 43 STAT. 972 (1925), 28 U. S. C. A. § 41 (20)
STAT. 1137 (1g9i), 28 U. S. C. A. §250 (i) (1927)

(x92) (The Tucker Act) ; 36
(The Court of Claims Act).
There is a statute permitting libels in personain against the government for admiralty
torts. 41 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U. S. C. A. 742 (1928).
3. United States v. Ringgold, 8 Pet. 150 (U. S.1834).
4.United States v. The Thekla, 266 U. S.328 (1924). While this case was being
decided, a statute (cited note 2 sipra) -was passed permitting libels against the United
States in the District Courts foe" maritime torts. In the Thekla case, Holmes, J., remarked that "the reasons that have prevailed against creating a government liability
in tort do not apply to a case like this."
5. I MOORE, FFDERAL PRACTIcE (1938) 71L See also United States v. National
City Bank of N. Y., 83 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 2d, i936), cert. denied. 299 U. S. 563
(1936) ; United States v. Stephandis, 4T F. (2d) 958 (E. D. N. Y. 1930). Contra:
United States v. Nipissing Mines Co., 2o6 Fed. 41 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913), cert. discharged,
U. S. 765 (1914).

6. "The objection to a suit against the United States is fundamental, whether it
be in the form of an original action or a set-off or a counterclaim. Jurisdiction in either
case does not exist -unless there is specific congressional authority." Taft, C. J., in
Nassau Smelting & Ref. Works v. United States, 266 U. S.1oi, io6 (1924).

RECENT CASES

arising out of -a different transaction from the one sued on by the government 7 and consequently it was properly disregarded in the principal case,
where the counterclaim arose out of the same transaction as the one sued on.
If only Congress can grant jurisdiction, there seems to be little basis for a
distinction between the two types of counterclaim, inasmuch as Congress
probably never intended that jurisdiction be gained by either type. However, as it seems fairer to allow the defendant to have the whole controversy
settled in one action rather than to leave his side of the case to the discretion
of the General Accounting Office,8 the position taken by the court in the
principal case is desirable. The unanimous opinion of writers on governmental tort immunity has been that the doctrine is an anachronism which
has no application to moden needs. 9 To allow a counterclaim in tort
against the government is to relax to some extent this much-criticised rule.
Federal Trade-FTC Has No Power to Control Intrastate Activities Affecting Interstate Commerce-The FTC found that defendant
was engaging in unfair methods of competition in the sale of catidy which
burdened interstate c'ommerce by reducing the sales of candy manufacturers
in interstate business.' Although defendant's business was carried on
entirely within one state, the Commission ordered it to desist from its
unfair practices. 2 Hetd 8 (three justices dissenting), deferkdant's activities
were not "in interstate commerce" and were therefore not subject to the
FTC's jurisdiction.4 FTC v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 6i Sup. Ct. (U. S. i94I).
It is well settled that Congress has the power to control certain activities which, although wholly intrastate, have a direct effect on interstate
commerce. 5 In this case the Court restricted itself to a determination of
whether the FTC Act 6 gave the Commission any power at all over intra7. United States v. Shaw, 309 U. S. 495 (1940) ; Nassau Smelting & Ref. Works
v.United States, 266 U. S. 1o (1924) ; Illinois C. R. R. v. Public Utilities Comm.,
245 U. S. 493 (x918); see r MOOaE, loc. cit. ipra note 5; but see United States v.
Nipissing 'Mines Co., 2o6 Fed. 431 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913), cert. discharged,234 U. S. 765

(1914).
& "All claims and demands whatever by the Government of the United States or
against it . . . shall be settled in the General Accounting Office." 42 SlAT. 24
(1921), 31 U. S. C. A. §71 (1927).
42 STAT. io66 (1922), 31 U. S. C. A. §215
(1927), provides that the head of each department of the government may make compensation for damages to private property caused by the negligence of the department's
agents, where the amount of the claim does not exceed $iooo.
9.Of the numerous articles criticizing the rule of government immunity, the most
complete discussion of the subject is found in a series of articles by Professor Borchard,
entitled Govenmmental Responsibility in Tort (1928) 28 Co. L. REv. 577, 734; (1927)
36 YALE L.J. 757, 1039; (1926) 36 id. x; (1925) 34 id. z2g; (1924) 34 id. 1, 129. See
also Axx. RE.'. AT-r'y GE-. OF THE U. S. (1938) 9.
i. The unfair method of competition employed by Bunte Bros. was the sale of candy
in chance assortments. The Supreme Court declared this practice unfair in FTC v.
Keppel & Bro.. Inc., 291 U. S.304 (1934) ; (1934) 82 U. Or PA. L.RE'. 304.
2. Bunte Bros., Inc., 27 FTC gii (1938).
3. Justice Frankfurter wrote the majority opinion. Justices Douglas, Black and
Reed dissented.
4. Affirming Bunte Bros., Inc. v. FTC, i1o F. (2d) 412 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940);
(1940) 53 HAM. L. R.

12o5.

5.United States v. Darby Lumber Co.. 61 Sup. Ct. 451 (U. S.194i) ; NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 3oi U. S. 1 (1937) ; Houston, E. &IV. T. Ry. v. United
States, 234 U. S.342 (194). See CoRw1N, TnE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MF.A.NS
TODAY (4th ed. 1930) 22-32.
6.52 STAT. 1028 (1938), 15 U. S. C. A. § 45 (1927) (the FrC Act) declares that
"The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevc';"
-tons, partnerships,
or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of competition in commerce.
§ 44 provides that "'Commerce' means commerce among the FCviral states...

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

986

state activities and found that it did not; therefore it did not face the question whether defendant's intrastate competitive methods had a sufficient
impact on interstate commerce to bring it within the commerce power. T In
the Shrueport case," where a similar statute was involved,9 the Court
decided that the ICC had the power to control intrastate railroad rates
which resulted in discriminatory preferences as compared with interstate
rates set by the commission. The dissenting opinion relied strongly on
that case in urging that "in interstate commerce" should be construed as
including activities affecting interstate commerce. 10 The majority rejected
this interpretation, emphasizing the fact that a broad interpretation of the
statute in the Shreveport case led to very limited inroads into the states'
control of commerce within their borders, while such a construction in the
instant case would extend the federal power to include "myriads of businesses" hitherto left to local law." Apparently the split arose in the court
fundamentally, not from the wording of the Act, but from the magnitude
of the expectable consequences of a broad interpretation of it. The majority
felt that Congress could not have intended to grant such sweeping powers
without a clearer expression of such an intent, while the minority thought
that Congress intended to grant as much power as it constitutionally could.'2
Inasmuch as the FTC Act was intended to complement the Sherman Act,' 8
and since the Court accepted the Commission's finding that defendant's
activities had a harmful effect on interstate commerce, the latter view seems
the more desirable. Although an adoption of the minority's view would
undeniably have involved an invasion by the Commission of a large field
heretofore considered the domain of the states, where effective control of
interstate commerce is at stake, state control should be subordinated to the
federal power. Although the Court left unanswered the question whether
intrastate competition can affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come
within the power of Congress, in view of the trend of recent decisions, it
seems likely that it would have found in favor of the Commission on this

point.1"

7. "This case presents the narrow question of what Congress did, not what it could
Instant case at 584.
& Houston, E. & W. T. Ry. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342 (1914).
9. 24 STAT. 383 (1887). The Interstate Commerce Act expressly provided that it
should not apply to transportation wholly within one state.
io. "The interrelation between intrastate and interstate activities in the instant case
is hardly less intimate than in the Shreveport case. The fact that the nexus here is economic and not physical is inconsequential." Instant case, dissenting opinion, at 585.
1x. Instant case at 583. The majority also stressed the Commission's failure to
claim regulatory powers over intrastate activities as an indication that effective enforcement of the FTC Act was not dependent on such powers. But see Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce v. FTC, 3 F. (2d) 673 (C. C. A. 8th, i926); Canfield Oil Co. v.
do."

FTC, 274 F. 571 (C. C. A. 6th,

1921).

Mfore modern statutes explicitly state that they grant jurisdiction over acts in
or affecting
interstate commerce. E. g. Fair Labor Standards Act. 52 STAT. 1062
8
(193 ), 29 U. S. C. A. § 2o6 (Supp. 1940) ; National Labor Relations Acts, 49 STAT.
450 (19.35). 29 U. S. C. A. § 152 (7) (Supp. 1940); Interstate Commerce Act, 4T
It should be noted, however, that
STAT. 484 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 13 (4) (1929).
these statutes were drafted after decisions of the Court had clarified Congress' powers
over intrastate activities affecting interstate commerce.
i.3. See FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U. S. 643, 647 (1931) ; FTC v. Beech-Nut Co.,
257 U. S. 441, 453 (1921). A conspiracy, although intrastrate, may be in restraint of
trade under the Sherman Act. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 397 (0o5).
14. See United States v. Darby Lumber Co.. 6T Sup. Ct. 451 (U. S. 1941) ; NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.. 301 U. S. s (1937). However, the manner in which
interstate commerce was affected in the instant case was entirely different from that in
the cases cited above. 'he FTC attempted to regulate the sale of goods which were
never to reach interstate commerce, and this may be found to be a basis for limitation
on the power of Congress.
12.

RECENT CASES

Restraint of Trade-Boycott to Eliminate Style Piracy as a Violation of Anti-Trust Laws-The defendant trade association was
organized by manufacturers of high-priced garments to eliminate the devastating effect on the market for such dress models of competition by manufacturers who mass-produced and sold at low prices garments copied from
these so-called originals. A boycott was therefore instituted against retailers who purchased from the latter manufacturers. Tile Federal Trade
Commission issued a cease and desist order ol the ground that the boycott
constituted an unfair method of competition tending to monopoly. Held,
the order should be affirmed. The boycott was an unreasonable restraint
of trade and hence unlawful under the Sherman and Clayton Acts,' Fashion
Originator's Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 9 U. S.
L. Week 4229 (U. S. 1941) ; 2 accord, Millinery Creator's Guild, Inc. v.
Federal Trade Commission, 9 U. S. L. Week 4231 (U. S. 194)2 (order
against a similar trade association of hat manufacturers affirmed).
The anti-trust laws apply only to "unreasonable" restraints.4 The
decisions cohflict as to what restraints are unreasonable. 5 Those following
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.0 hold that any combination which
has the power to or does control prices, quality, or production is unreasonable per se.1 These decisions are predicated on a faith in the regulatory
effectiveness of unrestricted competition and a fear of misuse of the potential power and the tendency to monopoly lodged in any combination. On
the other hand, the decisions following Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United
States 8 recognize that in some cases a combination to cure competitive
abuses within an industry may in the long run foster rather than restrict
competition." Or a combination may be held a reasonable restraint if the
competition restricted or controlled is so detrimental to society as a whole
as to outweigh the risk of the combination's being used for monopoly.' 0 In
line with more recent decisions 11 and following the tenor of the decisiof of
Justice Learned Hand in the Fashion Originator'sGuild case in the Second
i. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), is U. S. C. A. § r (1927), as amtended by so STAT. 693
(1937), '5 U. S. C. A. § (Supp. 1940); 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 12
(1927) ; 38 STAT. 718 (i921), i5 U. S. C. A. §41 (1927), as amended by S2 STAT. Iii
(1938), 15 U. S. C. A. §4i (Supp. 1940).
2. The instant case affirmed the decision of the circuit court. 114 F. (2d) 8o (C.
C. A. 2d, 1940) (Learned Hand, J.).
i. This case"also affirmed the decision of the case in the circuit court. 109 F. (2d)
175 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) (Clark, J.).
4. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. x (Ig1); United

States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. io6 (xgix).
5. (1939) 39 Cot- L. REv. 1441, 1447.

6. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392 (1927).

7. Instant case at 4230; United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co. et at., 31a U. S.

150 (1940), (1941) 89 U. oF PA. L. REv. 683, 684, n. 9; F. 0. G. A. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 114 F. (2d) So (C. C. A. 2d, i9.o) ; (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 750.

8. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States. 288 U. S. 344 (1933). Although this
case is limited on its facts, it is the leading case in recognizing that in some cases unrestricted competition is not to the best interests of society as a whole. The general
principles there laid down were approved, clarified, and refined in Sugar Institute, Inc.
v. United States, 297 U. S. 344 (1936).
9- Ibid.; Maple Flooring Mfr's Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 553 (1936);
Cement .Mfrs Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 588 (1925). See also Donovan, The Effect of the Decision in the Sugar Institute Case on Trade Association
Activities (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 929.
1o. See Millinery Creator's Guild, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, lo9 F. (2d)
175, 176 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
it.United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. et al., 31o U. S. i5o (i94o), (1941)
89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 683.
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Circuit Court of Appeals, 12 the instant Court seems to apply the more
rigid rule of the Trenton Potteries case."3 At the same time it avoided
facing the conflict squarely by stating baldly that the principles in the
Appalachian case were not applicable to the facts presented in the instant
case,"1 even though those principles were the basis of Justice Clark's opinion in the Millinery Creator'sGuild case also in the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals,' which also held that the combination was unlawful. Regardless of rationale, the result is sound, even though the effect is to leave unprotected not only creators of original designs,'6 but also those manufacturers
who have invested huge sums in copies of original creations from the style
center at Paris.2r Retailers of exclusive models will also lose the good
will and trade of customers who seek exclusive clothes.'
And the consumer of exclusive models will be hurt indirectly by the increased difficulty
of obtaining clothes which are in fact exclusive. Ncvertheless, the interests
of any or all of these classes is not enough to outweigh the interest of
consumers of small means in stylish clothes at low prices 19 and the interest of society in avoiding the risk of monopoly. " To allow the combination
would not only tend to create a monoply in an unpatentable idea,' 1 but also
would leave in the uncontrolled discretion of the association the power to
restrict a manufacturer's or retailer's business upon an arbitrary
determina22
tion by the association that his product was a pirated copy.
12. Fashion Originator's Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 114
F. (2d) 8o (C. C. A. 2d, i94o). This opinion pays lip service to the Appalachian case.
But even though the Trcnton Potteries case is not cited as authority, in effect the decision applies a rigid rule by stating that the rubric of unreasonableness is: "if the
means are unlawful per se, the purposes of the confederates will not justify." It also
cites United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 1So (1940), and points out
that although that case was one of price fixing by a combination and therefore illegal,
the instant combination was illegal because of the power to control the supply and with
it the price. In both the means employed, e. g., a combination, were illegal.
13. The decision in the instant case is not an incisive analysis of the problem.
14. Instant case at 4230.
15. Millinery Creator's Guild, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, log F. (2d) 175
(C. C. A. 2d, 594o), 8 GEo. WAsH. L. Rsv. 1122; 24 MiNx. L. REv. 1oo7; 26 VA. L
REv. 82& In applying the principles of the Appalachian case, two cases on the same
facts have reached the opposite result. William Filene's Sons Co. v. F. 0. G. A., go
F. (2d) $56 (C. C. A. Ist, 1937) ; Wolfenstein v. F. 0. G. A., 244 App. Div. 656, 280
N. Y. S. 361 (ist Dep't 1935) (Under the New York Anti-trust Law).
x6. See Millinery Creator's Guild, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, iog F. (2d)
175, 177 (C. C. A. 2d, 594o).
(The court there assumed that the interest of the creator
of otiginal hat styles was in question.)
17. See Fashion Originator's Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 1r4 F. (2d) 8o, 84 (C. C. A. 2d, i94o) (The court here assumed that the manufacturers of these so-called originals were in fact using copies of original creations from
Paris. "We are therefore to judge the Guild as a combination seeking to exclude outsiders from a market to which they have as lawful access as it has itself.").
i8.This would result if a customer bought what was claimed to be an exclusive
model and then discovered that the very same model could be purchased at a lower price
in almost any large retailing store.
ig. Millinery Creator's Guild, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, io9 F. (2d) 175,
177 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
2o. Two cases on the same facts have held that style piracy is such an evil as to
justify the existence of a combination and boycott See cases cited supra note 15.
21. See F. 0. G. A. v. Federal Trade Commission, 114 F. (2d) 8o, 85 (C. C. A.
2d, ig4o). An original creation is too slight a modifica2tion of a known idea to justify
the grant by the government of a monopoly to the creator nor has Congress yet seen
fit to extend the copyright laws to protect him.
2. (x9gLo) 24 MsxN. L REv. ioo7. Although an original dress or hat design does
not come within the statutory copyright protection, at common law a copyright exists
umtil a publication of the same through a general sale of the product. After whichthe design is freely imitable. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F. (2d) 279 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1929). See also (1940) 27 VA. L. Rv. 230, 231. In view of the fact that these
manufacturers do not have any right of action for violation of a property right in these

RECENT CASES

Taxation-Omission of Income from Optional Valuation of
Gross Estate-Executor elected to value the gross estate as of one
year after death.' Pursuant to the treasury regulation,2 collector included
therein rents, dividends, and interest earned and received during the year.
Held (two justices dissenting), overpayment of the tax refunded. Income
represented a sum not in fact property of the decedent at time of death.
Maass v. Higgins, 85 L. Ed. 590 (U. S. 1941).
Ihe instant case would be notable if only for the novel reversal of
position of the parties:3 the government advanced a technical and refined
legal-economic argument; the taxpayer championed an interpretation in
accord with reality and common understanding; 4 and the Supreme Court,
traditionally the government's best tax collector, found for the taxpayer.
The purpose of the optional valuation provision was to afford to estates
some relief from the hardships that might be imposed on them in a period
of rapidly falling markets and to insure that the tax bear an equitable relationship to the property actually distributed.5 In striking down the administrative regulation 0 as arbitrary, the court merely -afeguarded this policy.
Though Congress could undoubtedly have demanded that income be included in the gross estate, the limited evidence of the Congressional intent
left little doubt that such a view was never even considered., Hence, the
recent reenactment of the statute in the INT. REV. CODE was not an indication of approval and adoption of the administrative construction.$ The
designs, the instant decision may at first blush seem to leave them without any remedy.
However, these trade associations could refuse in combination to deal with retailers
who knowingly bought dresses of those who had stolen "unpublished" designs; or who
had got access to them by any other crime, or by a breach of promise not to use them.
See F. 0. G. A. v. Federal Trade Commission, I14 F. (2d) go, 84 (C.C. A. 2d, 1940).
To combat those who copy after publication, the remedy may be found if the manufacturers should seek equitable relief against style piracy on the ground of unfair competion. See Justice Holmes' separate concurring opinion in International News Service
v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 246 (i918). It must be remembered that whether
or not equitable relief is possible under state or Federal law should not affect the
question of whether a combination in restraint of trade is reasonable or not. Instant
case at 4231.
i. Rrv. AcT or i926, § 302 (j), as added by § 202 (a) of REv. AcT oF 1935. The
subsection has now been embodied in the INT. REv. CoDo, § 81i(j)(1939). "Optional
vauathion. If the executor so elects upon. his return . . ., the value of the gross
estate shall be determined by valuing all the property included therein on the date of
the decedent's death as of the date one year' after decedent's death, except that (1)
property included in the gross estate on the date of death and within one year after decedent's death distributed . . . or sold, exchanged or otherwise disposed of, shall be
included at its value as of the time of such distribution, sale, exchange, or other disposition, whichever first occurs, instead of its value as of the date one year after decedent's
death.

.

.

U. S. Treas. Reg. go, Art. xi, prescribes, in effect, for the inclusion in the gross
estate, when the option is exercised, of all rents, dividends, and interest, received and
earned during the year.
3. For the usual position, see such a case as Helvering v. Hallock, 3o9 U. S. Io6
(1940), where, in order to avoid the tax, the taxpayer unsuccessfully urged upon the
2.

court the niceties in traditional property concepts of future interests.
4. Cf. Coolidge v. Long, 282 U. S. 582 (193i). But see Binney v. Long, 299 U. S.
280 (1936).
5. 79 Co.G. REc. 14632 (1935). See Blattmachr, Valiation of Estates under See.
302 () of Federal Estate Tar Law (1938) 34 PA. BAR Ass'N Q. ioo.
6. The first change in the regulation appeared in T. D. 4627, XV-1 Cu.M. Bum.
34!, 344 (1936). U. S. Treas. Reg. go, Art. ii [see T. D. 4699, XV-2 Crm . BuLu. 293
(1936)] for the first time required the income from property accruing during the
year to be included in the valuation at the end of the year.
7. No mention of the problem at hand is found in committee reports or debates.
See, e. g., H. R. REP. No. 1885, 74th Cong., ist Sess. (x935) 9.
8. United States v. Hermano y Compania, 209 U. S. 337 (9o7): McCaryhon v.
Hershey Choc. Co., 283 U. S. 488 (193o), which held reenactment by Congress without
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government contended that for estate tax purposes assets consist of two
elements, ownership and the right to income, the value of the latter as of
the end of the year to be determined by the income received during the
year. The court dismissed the theory as merely an attempt to rationalize
the regulation.9 Since income received would become part of the gross
estate, emerging as payment attributable to the right to receive income,10
the practical effect of the regulation would be to postpone the date of the
decedent's death for one year." But this would appear to contradict the
express words of the statute, since it is merely the date of valuation that is
postponed. Moreover, substantial difficulties beset the regulation. Had
income been received and reinvested, would these assets, like the income
which bought them, be a part of the estate? Would expenses incurred in
getting the income be deducted? The dissenting justices thought that this
whole question was particularly appropriate for administrative interpretation and that therefore the court should not interfere. It would be unreasonable for Congress to confer the optional valuation date as a benefit, and
then to exact as a price for its acceptance the conditions found in the
regulation-with all the difficulties inherent in proper administration of
them. The court was properly unwilling to find that intent in the absence
of unequivocal language to support it.
Taxation-Transfer as Subject to Gift Tax Where the Income
May Be Paid to Donor-Settlor created a trust whereby the income
could be paid either to settlor or settlor's wife within the discretion of the
trustee. The trustee in fact paid the income to settlor. Held, that the entire
corpus of the trust is subject to the Federal gift tax.' Hercog v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 116 F. (2d) 591 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
As the need for revenue grows, there is a tendency to reconstrue transactions which formerly were considered inter vivos gifts as transfers really
taking effect at the death of the transferor, and hence subject to the high
rates of the Estate tax. 2 Thus, revocable trusts,3 transfers conditioned upon
survivorship'.4 and transfers with the possession or enjoyment retaineds
change of a statute which had previously received long continued executive construction,
or repeated reenactment of a tax provision under which treasury regulations had been
adopted for its enforcement, were thought of as very persuasive for the validity of the
instant regulation. But here the statute and regulation were of recent origin, and the
only reenactment was in the I-iT. REV. CODE (53 STAT. 122) (1939). Moreover, where
the law is plain, subsequent reenactment does not constitute adoption of its administrative construction. Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U. S. 431 (1937); Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U. S. 441 (1935).
9. The second circuit had upheld the government. Saks v. Higgins, ixi F. (2d)
78 (C. C. A. 2d, t94o), aff'g. 29 F. Supp. 996 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); accord, City Farmers Bank and Trust Co., 41 B. T. A. Ti78 (1940). Contra: Clark v. United States, 33
F. Supp. 216 (D. Md. 1940). See (1940) 40 Cot.. L. Rh'v. 1091, 26 VA. L. REV. io68.
io. The inapplicability of the doctrine to dividends was even recognized by the
court upholding the regulation. Saks v. Higgins, iTi F. (2d) 78 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
The uniform legal conception of di':,lcnds in no way constitutes them as property of
the decedent. See Green v. Fhiladelphia Inquirer Co., 329 Pa. 169, 196 Atl. 32 (1938).
it. Cf. N. Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345 (1920) ; Schuette v. Bowers, 40
F. (2d)

2o8 (C. C. A. 2d, I930).

I. 47 STAT. 2.15 (1032), -6 U. S. C. A. § moo (1939).
2. MON'or:.RY, FF.ZR.AF. TAx IIxxm,,ooK (1940-41)

1715-19.

3. Ilelvering v. City Bank Farmrs Trust Co., 296 U. S. 85 (1935) ; Porter v.
Convniss'.cr of Internal Revenue, 288 U. S. 436 (1933) ; Reinecke v. Northern Trust
Co., 278 U. S. 339 (1929).
4. Helvering v. Hallock, 3o U. S. io6 (1940) ; Klein v. United States, 283 U. S.
231 (1931).

5. -elvering v. Bullard, 303 U. S. 297 (1937) ; Helvering v. Mercantile-Commerce
Bank & Trust Co., ii

F. (2d) 224 0940).

RECENT CASES

are now held to be part of the donor's gross estate. It would therefore
seem that in the instant situation, 6 where the income of the transferred
property was in fact paid to the donor at the trustee's discretion, the court
by deeming the transaction a consummated gift for gift tax purposes overlooked the modern tendency and the very practical interest reserved by the
settlor. Yet, there is a possibility that the instant case represents a step
towards further broadening of the sphere of Federal taxation. This would
be true if upon the donor's death the corpus should be declared a part of7
the decedent's gross estate, and hence also subject to the Estate tax.
Although there are dicta that the Congressional intent is to preclude such
double taxation, 8 there seems little validity in this contention. Both the
language of the statutes 1 and decisions permitting double taxation in cases
of gifts in contemplation of death,10 tenancies by the entirety where the
husband furnished the purchase price,1" and gifts in trust where the donor
reserved the power to alter with the consent of an-adverse party,12 give
force to the belief "8that the taxes are not mutually exclusive.

Torts--.Privilege to Induce -Breach of Usurious Contract-Defendant bar association conducted a newspaper campaign inducing wage
earners to repudiate usurious small loan contracts and offered free legal
protection.1 Plaintiff, a small loan company, seeks an injunction. Held,
defendant was privileged to induce breach of contracts which were themselves illegal.2 Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Association, 12 S. E. (2d) 602
(Ga. i94o).
6. See for similar facts and result Rheinstrom v. Coibmissioner of Internal Rev224 (1940).
7. 44 STAT. 70 (Iz926), 26 U. S. C. A. § 8i (1939).
8. Sanford v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 308 U. S. 39 (1939) ; Burnet v.
Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 28o (1933).
9. "The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including
the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible
wherever situated, except real property situated outside of the United States." 44
STAT. 70 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. §811 (939).
"A tax shall be imposed upon the transfer during such. calendar year by any individual, resident or non-resident, of property by gift.
. ."
47 STAT. 245 (1932), 26
U. S. C. A. §
0oo(1939).
io. Even those cases declaring the taxes mutually exclusive admit transfers of
gifts in contemplation of death an exception to the rule, and hence subject to .both
assessments. Sanford v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 3o8 U. S. 39 (1939);
Hesslein v. Hoey, 91 F. (2d) 954 (1937).
ii. Helvering v. Bower, 303 U. S. 618 (1937) ; Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Hart, io6 F. (2d) 269 (19.39): Lilly v. Smith. 96 F. (2d) 341 (938).
12. Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U. S. 85 (1935)..
23. See Magill, The Federal Gift Tax (1940) 40 COL L R,. 773."

enue, 1o5 F. (2d)

i. The campaign was organized to fight the practice of taking an assignment of
future wages at rates of interest as high as 520%. The Bar Association listed its aims
(a) "to investigate present usury laws and to recommend legislative changes, if needed,
to prevent the collection of usurious interest from impoverished borrowers in Georgia,
(b) to invite public co-operation in stamping out the violation of these laws and to ask
for information relative to persons and -agencies guilty of charging usurious interest,
(c) to request employers to advise their employees that the collection of usurious rates
is forbiddcn by law and to ask employees who may have become involved with usurious

lenders to report such transactions to the committee on enforcement of usury laws . .. ,

(d) to aid persons in resisting the illegal claims of so-called 'loan sharks', such legal

assistance to be rendered by members of the committee without charge". Instant case

at 6o8 (reprinted from the Atlanta Constitution, Feb. 25, 1940).
2. The Georgia Small Loans Act makes any contract for the assignment or pledge
of any unearned wages or salary for the purpose of securing a loan of money, void.
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The intentional inducement of repudiation of contract is an actionable
wrong.$ An inducer may, however, be privileged.' The law is still in a
state of flux where such privilege is concerned.5 Decisions have determined privilege by a two-fold test, the interests of the inducer, and the
social desirability of the breach. 6 The essence of the first test is to ascertain whether the inducer is an intermeddler or whether he has a legitimate
legal interest to protect. The test of social desirability has found judicial
response where public policy supports the inducer in protecting the interests of a closely-related individual,7 the general health or morals of the
community,$ or of a particular social group. 9 Fundamentally the interests

of the inducer and of society are balanced against the policy against impairment of the contract.10 The instant court allowed a large-scaled inducement of breach of contracts involving usurious rates of interest, justifying
the result by stressing their illegality. Pressure against usury should have
the support of the courts. On the other hand serious obstacles are presented where the right to contract and the right to carry on business are
impaired. Moreover, enforcement of public laws by private persons is
undesirable, especially in the instant case where the action of the defendant
if not unethical from a professional point of view, bordered on maintenance.
Nevertheless, the instant case was correctly decided in view of the flagrant
violations of the usury laws and of the overwhelming social policy in favor
of protecting wage earners against the weakness of their economic position.
GA. CODE (1935) c. 25, § =ao. It also provides ". .

no person . . . shall directly

or indirectly charge . . . or receive any interest or consideration greater than eight
per cent per annum upon a loan . . . of the amount of $3oo or less ...

No loan for which a greater rate of interest or charge than is allowed by this

chapter . . . shall be enforced. . .

."

Id. § 317.

3. The doctrine had its origin with the case of Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216
(853). For a resume of the development of this tort, see RESTArFMENT, TORTS (1939)
§ 766, comment b; Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract (1923) 36 HARV. L. REv. 663.
4. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (939) § 766. See also HARPER, TORTS (933) J 232;
Carpenter, Interference with Contract Relations (1928) 41 HARv. L. REv. 728.
S. There has been much hesitancy about declaring any form of dogmatic policy
where privilege exists. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) § 767, comment a. It is
generally noted that privilege was first found in the English case of Brimelow v. Casson [1924] I Ch. 302, 38 HARv. L. REv. iiS (1925) 23 MIcH. L. REv. 518 (where
manager of theatre paid chorus so little that they were forced to immorality). The
few subsequent decisions are based upon the reasoning of this case. The Restatement
reporters determined that the authorities are too scarce and this case too extreme on
its facts to warrant stating any definite broad principle. See (1939) 16 PRoc. A. L. I.
15o-5&

6. See Carpenter, op. cit. smpra, note 4 at 745, '46. It has been suggested that the
legal status of the parties be determined by looking at (a) the nature of the means
used by the inducer, (b) the nature of the contractual relations disturbed, and (c) the
motive of the inducer. Note (1932) 17 CORNe. L_ Q. 5o9, 512.
7. A privilege of parents and relatives has been recognized in engagment to marry
cases. Conway v. O'Brien, 269 Mass. 425, 169 N. E. -491 (193o). Similar privilege
is extended to the guardian-ward relationship.
8. Brimelow v. Casson [1924] i Ch. 302; cf. Legris v. Mlarcotte, r29 Ill. App. 67
(igo6).
9. Reid, C. J., commenting upon this policy said, "We do not believe that it is
true . . . that the enforcement of the usury laws of this State is a matter solely for
the law enforcement officers and of those from whom usury is being exacted and that it
is illegal and unethical for lawyers to publicly criticize an alleged widespread violation
of such laws and to seek to eradicate the evil by the means here shown. Much could
be said as to why their position in the community makes it entirely appropriate that
they undertake such a movement and assume such responsibilities in reference to the
general welfare of the public." Instant case at 6io, 6u1.
io. Carpenter, op. cit supra note 4, at 745.

